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Research has shown that the brain is constantly making predictions about future events.
Theories of prediction in perception, action and learning suggest that the brain serves to
reduce the discrepancies between expectation and actual experience, i.e., by reducing
the prediction error. Forward models of action and perception propose the generation of
a predictive internal representation of the expected sensory outcome, which is matched
to the actual sensory feedback. Shared neural representations have been found when
experiencing one’s own and observing other’s actions, rewards, errors, and emotions such
as fear and pain. These general principles of the “predictive brain” are well established
and have already begun to be applied to social aspects of cognition. The application
and relevance of these predictive principles to social cognition are discussed in this
article. Evidence is presented to argue that simple non-social cognitive processes can
be extended to explain complex cognitive processes required for social interaction, with
common neural activity seen for both social and non-social cognitions. A number of
studies are included which demonstrate that bottom-up sensory input and top-down
expectancies can be modulated by social information. The concept of competing social
forward models and a partially distinct category of social prediction errors are introduced.
The evolutionary implications of a “social predictive brain” are also mentioned, along
with the implications on psychopathology. The review presents a number of testable
hypotheses and novel comparisons that aim to stimulate further discussion and integration
between currently disparate fields of research, with regard to computational models,
behavioral and neurophysiological data. This promotes a relatively new platform for inquiry
in social neuroscience with implications in social learning, theory of mind, empathy, the
evolution of the social brain, and potential strategies for treating social cognitive deficits.
Keywords: predictive coding, social interaction, forward models, prediction error, sensorimotor control, social
learning, imitation, social decision-making
INTRODUCTION
“Engage people with what they expect; it is what they are able to
discern and confirms their projections. It settles them into predictable
patterns of response, occupying their minds while you wait for the
extraordinary moment—that which they cannot anticipate.”
Sun Tzu, The Art of War.
It has long been known by military strategists, psychologists,
and neuroscientists that surprise and uncertainty can occur at
a high cost. We live in an uncertain world full of ambiguous
stimuli and events of which we are not sure of. Preparedness pro-
motes efficiency, and this is true not only of behavior, but is also
reflected in representations of an optimized neural system. For
the brain to be energetically efficient and for our behavior to be
optimal and adaptive, we utilize knowledge from our previous
experiences to make predictions about the future and minimize
the cost of surprise (Friston et al., 2006). In the animal kingdom,
such previous experiences are often pre-programmed or innate
through the forces of natural and sexual selection, that is, the flex-
ibility of the prediction process is small. In “higher” mammals
such as primates, pre-programmed patterns also exist (Tinbergen,
1951). However, due to the complexity and variability of the
environment, the prediction mechanisms are much more plastic,
and the programmes more open to personal (ontogenetically
acquired) experience (Mayr, 1974). The brain’s attempts to min-
imize the discrepancy between expectations or predictions and
actual experience, addresses the problem of uncertainty and opti-
mality, while also providing a common fundamental principle
for processing incoming sensory information in our environment
(Friston, 2005). The ideas just expressed here illustrate a gener-
alized description of the role of prediction in cognition and the
brain, and is becoming the consensus on a general and univer-
sal principle of how the brain works. Expectation, prediction,
inference, anticipation, foresight, prospection, forecasting, and
preparation are all terms that have been used to refer to different
types of predictive processes that occur in the brain, in cognition
and are evident in overt behavior. Predictive processing can refer
to any psychological or neural process that utilizes estimations
about the future. The proposal of the “predictive brain” broadly
states that we are constantly generating mental representations to
predict future states of the world around us, and about our own
future internal mental state (e.g., Bar, 2007). These predictions
of the future can include short-term estimations about upcoming
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events in one’s current situation, and also long-term prospections
about the likelihood of events occurring in the distant future,
outside of our currently situated environment. It is thought that
these predictive internal representations of the future are con-
stantly compared with the actual perceived outcome of internal
mental and external events. We must be able to process our errors
to learn from ourmistakes, and consequently update internal rep-
resentations of the predicted future. This allows us to learn from
our previous experiences. Many authors have implied that predic-
tive and inferential processes underlie a wide range of cognitive
processes, including, most prominently, motor control (Wolpert
and Miall, 1996), perceptual inference (Friston and Kiebel, 2009)
and reward-based associative learning (Schultz and Dickinson,
2000).
Social neuroscience seeks to find the underlying neural mech-
anisms responsible for social behavior. To successfully navigate
ourselves through the social world, we must be able to understand
socially relevant stimuli, make interpretations about their mean-
ing and behave according to decisions that are accurate, optimal,
and adaptive. This includes understanding others’ minds, and
their intentions and beliefs. Inference and estimation is essen-
tial to social understanding, particularly as social scenarios are
riddled with complex circumstances filled with ambiguity and
uncertainty. The central role of predictive mechanisms in motor
control, perception, and learning are clearly evident and well-
documented, though a fast-growing body of experimental and
theoretical work is providing increasing evidence of how such
predictive mechanisms are also embedded in social cognitive pro-
cesses. Shared neural representations of one’s own experience and
the experience of others’ lies at the heart of this work (Decety
and Sommerville, 2003). Similar neural activity has been revealed
in the observer when both experiencing and observing actions
(Gallese et al., 1996), rewards (Marco-Pallares et al., 2010), and
emotions such as fear (Olsson et al., 2007) and pain (Cheng
et al., 2008). The interpersonal connection of shared experience,
as also represented by shared neural representations, is likely to
form the basis for high-level social cognitions such as empathy
(Decety and Ickes, 2009). Although it is still not as clear as to
what degree predictive mechanisms may underlie social cogni-
tions and how predictive mechanisms drive processing during
social perception, social understanding, social interaction, and
social learning. Numerous conceptualizations of predictive mech-
anisms have been made to account for different psychological and
neural phenomena, each with their own specification of what pre-
diction is, and how it is generated and utilized. The increasing
popularity and support for the concept of a “predictive brain”
calls for further discussion about whether this framework can be
extended to other domains such as social cognition, and especially
where conceptual boundaries between specifications may lie.
Given the broad scope of the implications of prediction in
fundamental cognitive and neural processes, and in light of the
evidence that in primates the complexity of the social environ-
ment has been a major driving force of cognitive evolution, it
follows that predictive mechanisms are likely to both underlie and
modulate processes involved in social cognition and social inter-
action. The aim of this article is to highlight recent theoretical and
empirical work that is at the interface of the “predictive brain” and
the “social brain.” Our article is intended to propose extensions
of predictive mechanisms of fundamental cognitive processes into
the context of social cognitions. The goal is to highlight the poten-
tial for operationalizing social cognitive processes in predictive
coding frameworks and related predictive mechanisms. The hope
is that this will promote further discussion on the potential for
extending current predictive frameworks in action, perception,
and learning to cognitions required for socially relevant cognitive
processes.
THE PREDICTIVE BRAIN
Before discussing the relationship between the predictive brain
and the social brain, some crucial points will be introduced,
which are particularly relevant to the issues related to social cogni-
tion. The terminology used to label different predictive processes
can determine the definition of the mechanisms being referred
to, and therefore it is important, for this article and for future
work exploring this topic, to provide operational definitions
of the terms being used. The mathematical methods on which
computational models representing neural activity and behav-
ior are built upon provide the basis for the application of the
principles of predictive coding. The basics of the role of predic-
tion in perception, action, and learning will also be introduced
here.
PREDICTION, INFERENCE, AND SIMULATION
We can roughly distinguish between three main predictive con-
cepts that are relevant to different aspects of the predictive social
brain; these are inference, prediction, and simulation. Inference
can refer to deterministic short-term processes that are largely
situated in current behavior and are probabilistic estimations
about the state of the world, and are most relevant to pre-
diction errors and concepts modeled with Bayesian statistics
(Friston et al., 2009). In contrast, the term “prediction” is gen-
erally more relevant to long-term prospections made about the
potential for distant future events to occur. Simulation can be
stated as a constructed internal representation of imagined events
(Gilbert and Wilson, 2007) based on episodic memory (Williams
et al., 1996). This can include processes such as scene con-
struction that retrieves and integrates previous experiences to
form a coherent event or mental image (Schacter and Addis,
2007), and is somewhat autobiographical in nature (Buckner
and Carroll, 2007). Related to this is the framework of the pre-
dictive brain from Barsalou (2009) who describes simulation as
a “re-enactment of perceptual, motor, and introspective states
(e.g., affect, motivation, intentions, metacognition, etc.)”. For
the sake of integration, but without intended overgeneraliza-
tion, the use of the term “predictive mechanisms” in this article
does not only refer to higher-level long-term prospections about
the future, but are also inclusive of the more fundamental low-
level short-term predictive processes of inference, such as those
conceptualized in Bayesian predictive coding formulations of
action and perception. The frequent lack of consistency in the
previous use of these terms reflects a need for further specifi-
cation of what they imply, though the use of these terms are
clarified operationally in this article according to the context
discussed.
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BAYESIAN INFERENCE
To introduce the concept of the predictive brain, it is impor-
tant to mention the basic principles behind Bayesian statistics,
as this underlies many of the predictive coding frameworks in
perception, action, and learning. Bayesian statistical inference is
a mathematical method of inference which incorporates priors,
or prior beliefs learned from previous experiences that gener-
ate internal models of a predicted outcome, and consequently
act as top-down modulators of bottom-up sensory input. This
statistical method can be used to determine the probability of
a certain outcome, given a predetermined assumption (i.e., the
prior “belief” and the likelihood), which can then be subsequently
updated according to the actual outcome. This is thought to be
comparable to how the brainmakes predictions about future out-
comes in learning and motor control. An example of Bayesian
inference states that we already have a prior belief of the probabil-
ity of seeing either a white van or a white polar bear in the street,
and thus the probability of receiving the visual input of a white
van will be much higher than that of a white polar bear.While this
example clearly relates to one’s acquired knowledge, priors can
also be innate. For example, visual perception experiments have
shown that the recognition pattern of an object changes just by
turning the image of the object by 180◦, because animals have the
built-in expectation that natural light comes from above (Schober
and Rentschler, 1972). The Bayesian inferential approach can be
used to create simulated models of neural activity. Substantial
experimental evidence demonstrates that motor learning is per-
formed by subjects in a Bayesian fashion (Kording and Wolpert,
2004) with probabilistic calculations being performed in the brain
to predict future sensory consequences. This Bayesian predictive
coding scheme has been applied to perceptual inference (Kiebel
et al., 2009), perceptual learning (Friston, 2008), reinforcement
learning (Friston et al., 2009), active inference (Friston et al.,
2010), attentional processing (Feldman and Friston, 2010), and
sensorimotor control (Wolpert and Miall, 1996).
INFERENCE AND PREDICTION IN PERCEPTION AND ACTION
It is clear that perception is not just a merely reactive pro-
cess in which sensory input is received and registered, but is
more likely a construction of predicted representations of the
environment. The concept of generative internal models in per-
ception was proposed many years ago, and represents another
common principle that is at the basis of some predictive coding
frameworks. The first experimental evidence found to support
the proposal of predictive internal models of perception came
from Sperry (1950), referring to a “corollary discharge,” and von
Holst and Mittelstaedt (1950) referring to an “efference copy.”
These were both set out to explain how we perceive a stable
world despite rapid and frequent eye movements. In both per-
ception and action, the efference copy creates a predicted internal
(“forward”) model of the sensory feedback according to the corre-
sponding visual percept or motor action. The corollary discharge
is then generated from this forward model and is then com-
pared to the actual incoming sensory feedback, or afference, once
transmitted from the peripheral sensory receptor to the brain.
The matching process that occurs between the generative forward
model, or corollary discharge, and the corresponding sensory
feedback is thought to maintain the experience of stability in the
ever-changing visual scene during eye movement. During motor
control, the matching process between the generative forward
model of the planned action and the sensory consequence of
the action is thought to be the neural basis for distinguishing
between self-generated and externally generated motor actions
(Blakemore et al., 1998). Predictive coding in visual processing
has been implemented in various hierarchical models (Rao and
Ballard, 1999) that generally propose an integration of top-down
expectancies and bottom-up sensory input reflecting stimulus
information. Feedforward connections carry error signals, but
in addition, cortical feedback connections transmit expectancy
biases or predictions. A similar matching process is thought to
occur during the execution of motor actions, and has been argued
to be the underlying mechanism that maintains a sense of agency
or ownership over our ownmotor actions. A mismatch, i.e., a dis-
crepancy between the predictive forward model and the actual
sensory feedback, can have pathological consequences, particu-
larly relevant to schizophrenia and pathological abnormalities in
ownership of action (Feinberg, 1978). This discrepancy between
the expected and actual sensory outcome of a visual percept or
motor action can also be referred to as a prediction error.
The coupling of action and perception is well-established, with
the ideomotor framework even considering action and perception
as inseparable, and fundamentally the same (Prinz, 1997). The
ideomotor theory of action proposes that internal representations
or images of actions are coupled to the execution of actions them-
selves, and that perceptual events associated with an action also
initiates an internal representation of that action. [e.g., the the-
ory of event coding (TEC) (Hommel et al., 2001)]. Frameworks
for forward models of action have been formulated and opera-
tionalized in computational models, such as the MOSAIC model
(Haruno et al., 2001), which rely on Bayesian inferential statistics.
In such frameworks, “forward” refers to the causal direction from
motor command into the corresponding sensory consequence,
with the forward model (“predictor”) being generated from the
efference copy. An inverse model (“controller”) represents the
opposite direction, whereby desired sensory consequences are
transformed into motor commands. Computational representa-
tions of forward models of action have been formulated with
Bayesian statistics, with priors and their likelihood acting as
predictive elements for the outcome of an action.
PREDICTION IN LEARNING AND DECISION-MAKING
Prediction also crucially guides learning through the updating of
future estimations about the state of the world and probabilities
of the likelihood of potential future events. Computing proba-
bilistic predictions about the outcomes of one’s own and others’
actions is based on previously learned action-effect contingen-
cies, i.e., the associative mapping between the action and the
outcome. Reward prediction errors generated in dopaminergic
neurons, are thought to encode the magnitude of the discrep-
ancy between expected reward and experienced reward (Schultz
and Dickinson, 2000) and therefore, drive decision-making. This
reward prediction error acts as a teaching signal for updating
expected reward value and is the neural basis for learning. Error
processing, response monitoring, and cognitive control are also
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intrinsic to predictive processing (Hoffmann and Falkenstein,
2011), whereby errors are generated by the discrepancy between
our predictions and the actual outcome, and allow us to learn
from our mistakes. The neural substrate underlying the valua-
tion of positive and negative feedback is largely founded upon the
reward processing system in the brain.
THE PREDICTIVE SOCIAL BRAIN
Social interaction and social functioning involves a multitude of
socially relevant cognitive processes including, to name a few,
social perception, understanding others’ actions, observational
social learning, social decision-making, and empathy. Top-down
influences of social information can directly drive how we process
visual information. More evidence is emerging which suggests
that a similar mechanism, or “shared neural representation”
is used for understanding others’ actions, whereby an internal
model of others’ actions allows us to make predictions about
the consequence and outcome of an observed action, and con-
sequently understand and interpret the goals and intentions of
the action. Many authors have suggested how conceptualizations
of fundamental cognitions such as learning, could be extended
to explain mental processes required for social understanding,
social interaction, and social learning (e.g., Rushworth et al.,
2009). There is also substantial work to indicate that there is
top-down influence of social information and social interaction
on fundamental error processing, learning, and decision-making
processes.
We now present neurophysiological and behavioral findings,
and computational principles that point to an essential relevance
of predictive mechanisms in a broad variety of social cognitive
processes that may be intrinsic to motor, perceptual, and learning
processes, and permeate different levels of processing. Numerous
parallels are also drawn to illustrate how the basic principles in
prediction, inference, and simulation in non-social contexts can
be applied to social aspects of cognition.
SOCIAL PERCEPTION AND SEEING OTHERS’ ACTIONS
Person perception can be described as the impressions or mental
representations we form of others based on socially constructed
information, for which the perception of actions and faces act as
crucial cues, and which predictive mechanisms are likely to also
play a central role. The superior temporal sulcus (STS) is involved
in the perception of biological motion and in inferring the inten-
tions or goals from biological motion (Perrett and Emery, 1994;
Allison et al., 2000; Jellema et al., 2000), and has been impli-
cated in the mirroring network (Molenberghs et al., 2010). When
we observe others’ actions, we can see activity in the STS and it
is, therefore, likely related to the mirror system and possibly in
determining whether movements have social relevance. A recent
study used an fMRI repetition suppression paradigm to measure
activity in the action observation network while watching a robot,
an android, and a human move (Saygin et al., 2012). This study
interestingly found neural activity that was distinctive for the mis-
match between (human versus robotic) appearance and motion,
which was proposed to reflect prediction error activity, possibly as
an index of an expectancy violation. They also suggested that this
mismatch prediction error signal could account for the “uncanny
valley” in which androids are seen as strange and disconcerting if
they are too human-like (Mori, 1970).
The STS also appears to have a role in face perception, and the
perception of the dynamic features of a face (Haxby et al., 2000;
Gobbini and Haxby, 2007; Ishai, 2008). An MEG study from Furl
et al. (2007) found that evoked neuromagnetic fields, originating
from the fusiform face area (FFA) and the STS, were modu-
lated by adaptation to facial expressions, and that these predicted
behavioral after-effects. They propose that this can be explained
by experience-dependent coding, according to a predictive cod-
ing account, which consequently creates top-down biases in face
perception. Another phenomenon of face perception, in which
low level visual processes may be modulated by socially relevant
factors, is the “other-race effect.” People have been shown to be
better at recognizing faces of their own race as opposed to other
races (O’Toole et al., 1994; Meissner and Brigham, 2001), which
appears to occur at the visual encoding stage of face processing
(Walker and Tanaka, 2003). This effect could be accounted for
by after-effects from visual adaptation to facial race categories
(Webster et al., 2004) that is likely to be based on long-term exper-
tise and learning processes (Rhodes et al., 1989; Stahl et al., 2010),
and has been represented by hierarchical generative models in a
predictive coding framework (Furl et al., 2007).
Social perception can refer broadly to high-level visual pro-
cessing of socially relevant stimuli, though social factors can also
influence low-level visual processing performance. One major
challenge for theories of forward models of action is to demon-
strate an inverse relationship in which motor behavior directly
influences perception. It has been shown that synchronized and
communicative interaction can influence visual discrimination
performance (Neri et al., 2006), and improve visual detection
of biological motion (Manera et al., 2011), respectively. Manera
et al. (2011) explain their finding in terms of predictive cod-
ing in that one’s own communicative gestures can predict the
other’s expected action. Bortoletto et al. (2011) found, with EEG
event-related potentials (ERPs), that action plans and intentions
of observed hand gestures can modulate ERPs associated with
early visual processing of the observed actions. Motor training
has been shown to directly modulate activity in the occipital
lobe (Engel et al., 2008), and TMS over the ventral premotor
cortex, but not the primary cortex suppressed a visual after-
effect when categorizing others’ actions (Cattaneo et al., 2011).
These studies demonstrate an early effect of social interaction
on low-level visual processing, at an early stage of processing
before awareness, therefore confirming the inverse relationship.
Research on the neural processing associated with observing oth-
ers’ actions has received widespread interest in a broad range of
research areas, particularly in the last 15 years, though there still
seems to be some divergence in theoretical standpoints, which
could potentially be bridged with a common dialog of predictive
mechanisms.
PREDICTION AND THE MIRROR SYSTEM
The discovery of the activation of apparently functionally-specific
“mirror neurons” in monkey premotor cortex during both action
execution and action observation (Gallese et al., 1996) has led to
broad speculations about their role in social cognition through
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action understanding. This hypothesis is compatible with simula-
tion theories of theory of mind (e.g., Davies and Stone, 1995),
which in general argues that individuals utilize simulations of
their own actions, and consequently their own thoughts, inten-
tions, beliefs, and emotions to predict the mental state of others
and therefore, ascertain knowledge of other minds. It is thought
that this then ultimately provides the fundamental elements for
the ability of an individual to understand, and empathize with,
the social behavior of others. Naturally, this has also revealed
a number of controversies questioning the functional specificity
of the mirror system (e.g., Hickok, 2009), and the anatomical
validity of a human mirror system as originally specified (e.g.,
Molenberghs et al., 2009; Mukamel et al., 2010).
Some alternative models of the mirror neuron system have
been put forward to try to deal with some of these issues and con-
troversies. One, which is most relevant here, is a predictive coding
account of the mirror neuron system (Kilner et al., 2007a,b) that
uses a Bayesian framework for its implementation. It argues that
an internal model is generated during action observation, which
in turn transfers an action prediction through backwards con-
nections, from frontal areas implicated in the mirror system, to
action representations in the STS and parietal mirror areas, which
then produces an action prediction error. As with other predic-
tive systems, the brain seeks to minimize the prediction error.
This has been demonstrated with simulations of handwriting that
artificially produce electrophysiological responses to movement
expectation violations (Friston et al., 2011). Another alternative
account of the mirror system is based on associative learning
(Heyes and Ray, 2000; Heyes, 2001), and argues that learned
sensorimotor experiences, from self-observation and the obser-
vation of others, actually promote the formation and emergence
of a mirror system, which is acquired and refined throughout
development. The learned associations of action contingencies
are thought to provide the basis for action understanding. This
associative learning account is supported by findings related
to expertise and familiarity of actions in motor cortex activ-
ity during action observation, and by studies showing neural
activity outside of the mirror neuron system during observation
of actions that are unfamiliar or difficult to understand (Brass
et al., 2007; Kilner and Frith, 2008). Greater expertise and famil-
iarity of observed actions induces greater activity in the action
observation/mirror-neuron network in the brain (Calvo-Merino
et al., 2005, 2006; Orgs et al., 2008). This is evident from both
practicing a particularmotor sequence and from passively observ-
ing actions (Cross et al., 2009). Automatic imitation and motor
interference also appears to be influenced by previous sensorimo-
tor experience (Capa et al., 2011). These findings lend themselves
to an associative learning account of imitation and the mirror sys-
tem (Catmur et al., 2009), whereby motor representations can be
learned through observation (Hayes et al., 2010). Although it is
likely that the coding of motor sequences for observed and prac-
ticed actions differs (Gruetzmacher et al., 2011), though this is
still an elusive, but crucial issue in conceptualizations of imitation
and action observation.
The only known single neuron recordings of the proposed
mirror system in the human brain comes from Mukamel et al.
(2010), who intriguingly found activity in the hippocampus, an
area never before included in the classical mirror system. The
involvement of the hippocampus in a mirror neuron network
could potentially be accounted for by Bar’s (2009) proposal of
the predictive brain with memory “scripts” as predictions, and
by Barsalou’s (2009) suggestion of the involvement of long-term
memory in simulation and perceptual prediction, which may not
have been detected previously with fMRI techniques. Bar presents
an integrated framework of perception and cognition that argues
that memory “scripts,” generated through learned associations
from previously real and imagined experiences, form the basis for
predictions of what is about to come next in our environment.
It is also suggested that this association-based prediction frame-
work can be applied to prediction in social interactions (Bar,
2007; Bar et al., 2007). By taking an inference-based account of the
mirror neuron system, this allows for the integration of Bar and
Barsalou’s frameworks into the realm of social cognition, action
understanding, and the mirror neuron hypothesis.
These accounts of the mirror neuron system highlight the
potential role of predictive mechanisms, particularly simulation,
and inference with the predictive coding, and associative learn-
ing accounts, in social interaction. Consequently, these accounts
could legitimately be extended to highlight the role of pre-
diction, simulation and inference in other non-motor social
cognitions associated with mirror neuron activity. Inference-
based accounts of the mirror neuron system could potentially
apply to some examples of work in social neuroscience show-
ing that mirror neuron activity has been implicated in the
distinction between self and other (Sinigaglia and Rizzolatti,
2011), mentalizing (De Lange et al., 2008; Centelles et al., 2011)
and simulation of emotions (Bastiaansen et al., 2009). Even
though the mirror neuron hypothesis provides a very appeal-
ing explanation for the processing of others’ actions, there are
other theories also related to predictive mechanisms that pro-
pose integrative frameworks for sensorimotor control and social
interaction.
FORWARD MODELS OF ACTION AND SOCIAL INTERACTION
Forwardmodels of action and the corollary discharge are thought
to be crucial in determining ownership of action, or sense of
agency, and being able to distinguish between self and other
by distinguishing between self-generated actions and movements
generated by external forces (Fourneret et al., 2001; Franck et al.,
2001; Knoblich et al., 2004; Yomogida et al., 2010). Numerous
studies have shown that our sense of agency for our actions
can be disturbed if there is a discrepancy in visuomotor percep-
tion between expected and intended actions (Daprati et al., 1997;
Franck et al., 2001; Van den Bos and Jeannerod, 2002). One recent
study demonstrating this found that a pre-reflective or implicit
sense of agency can be influenced by the accuracy of sensorimotor
predictions (Gentsch and Schutz-Bosbach, 2011). The ability to
distinguish between self and other is a fundamental prerequisite
for many social cognitive processes required for understanding
others.
A corollary discharge has also been proposed to be present
in the speech system, and is therefore, suggested to be respon-
sible for attributing self-generated speech as one’s own (Ford
and Mathalon, 2004). Evidence mostly comes from ERP work
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on occasions when a disturbance in the corollary discharge
occurs, which is relevant to symptoms seen in schizophrenia,
particularly with auditory hallucinations. This auditory corol-
lary discharge may also therefore, contribute to establishing the
distinction between self and other in verbal communication. A
recent study used MEG to compare valid and invalid predic-
tions made between visual speech input and auditory speech
signals (Arnal et al., 2011). From their results, they inferred that
top down predictions were coded by slower frequencies of neu-
ral activity, whereas prediction errors in audiovisual speech were
reflected by high frequency ranges. In a social interactive setting,
i.e., during natural verbal communication, Stephens et al. (2010)
found that spatiotemporal brain activity of the speaker and the
listener became synchronized, and the greater this coupling, the
greater the understanding. The findings also revealed anticipa-
tory neural responses in the listener, particularly in the striatum,
medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and dorsolateral prefrontal cor-
tex (DLPFC), areas that also encode the reward prediction error
and value representation.
An extension of one forward model framework of action, the
MOSAIC model, has been applied to explain social interaction
(Wolpert et al., 2003). The model parallels the sensorimotor loop
between the forward model and the incoming sensory informa-
tion, with the social interactive loop being between self-generated
and observed communicative actions. Communicative actions are
thought to be generated from the motor commands observed by a
confederate, which consequently causes changes in the observer’s
mental state, which in turn initiates communicative actions from
the other person, which are perceived by the observer. This for-
ward model of social interaction is proposed to allow us to make
predictions and learn about the likely behavior of another per-
son in response to our own communicative behavior. An inverse
model of action in social interaction is proposed to be used
to access the hidden mental states of others, and consequently
predict their behavior. The internal models of other people are
considered to be decoded and learned through the mappings
between our own actions and our own mental states as a priori
information, thereby using our ownmotor system to compute the
internal mental states of others, and are consequently suggested to
form a basis for theory of mind.
There are crucial differences between the hypotheses of the
mirror neuron system and forward models of action. Internal
forward models of action are likely to be coded in the cerebel-
lum (Wolpert et al., 1998). Consequently, neuroimaging studies
have suggested that some of the characteristics of internal mod-
els of action, seen from cerebellar activity, can be extended to
understanding higher-level cognitions including optimization of
behavior toward long-term goals and social interaction, particu-
larly in predicting and understanding of others’ actions, theory
of mind and language processing (Imamizu and Kawato, 2009).
Separate mechanisms in the cerebellum may underlie different
processes for switching internal models, with predictive switch-
ing being based on changes in context, and postdictive switching
being based on the sensorimotor prediction error (Haruno et al.,
2001). Though interestingly, activity associated with the predic-
tion error, used for the postdictive switch, was found in the
inferior parietal lobule (IPL) (Imamizu and Kawato, 2008), an
area implicated in the human mirror neuron network (Chong
et al., 2008).
It is evident that predictive mechanisms of simulation and
inference are likely to be central to both the mirror neuron
system and social forward models of action, and may underlie
fundamental processes recruited in social interaction. Predictive
forward models of action generated from efference copies also
may provide the basis for being able to dissociate ourselves from
others, on different levels of processing and in different sensory
and cognitive modalities. Novel comparisons can be established if
forward models of action and the mirror neuron hypothesis are
framed in a predictive coding scheme, and consequently stimu-
lating more dialog between the mirror neuron work and work on
forward models, while also having implications for social cogni-
tion. A crucial issue in making such comparisons is the degree to
which neural activity associated with simulated/imagined actions
or forward models of planned actions constitutes the same activ-
ity as that seen during the execution of a motor action.
PREPARING, PREDICTING, AND IMAGINING ACTIONS
The dynamic changes in neural activity during preparation,
online control, and imagination of one’s own movements are
likely to correspond with, and be embedded in, the neural pro-
cesses recruited in the prediction of action kinematics and action
understanding, during observation of others during social inter-
action (Grezes and Decety, 2001). One crucial and unresolved
issue when discussing the role of prediction in social cognition
and motor actions is to what degree preparatory, imagined, pre-
dictive, and observational motor responses overlap in terms of
neural activity and cognitive function. For example, it may be
the case that preparing for an action recruits a forward model,
and therefore, the associated neural activity could in part reflect
the generation of the forward model and the corollary discharge.
It is also not clear as to whether imagined actions also recruit a
forward model, but without the matching process of incoming
sensory feedback, which could also apply to the observation of
others’ actions in social interaction. To further clarify the role
for motor-related neural activity in social interaction and social
cognition, these issues need to be first resolved.
An ERP that has been found to be associated with motor
preparation is the contingent negative variation (CNV) (Walter
et al., 1964). The CNV partly overlaps with the lateralized
readiness potential (LRP), another similar motor preparatory
response. Kilner et al. (2004) have found that a CNV is also
evoked for observed actions, reflecting a preparatory or predic-
tive response to others’ actions. The LRP is thought to reflect
choice response (Coles, 1989), whereby lateralized motor cortex
activity is seen according to the hand used for response, before
the response is made. The LRP could be another ERP to use for
future explorations of how these preparatory motor responses
interact with social cognitions and social contexts, such as task-
sharing and action co-representation (Hollander et al., 2011). If
forward models are involved in motor preparation, then such
ERPsmost likely reflect the neural processing of the efference copy
or corollary discharge for both one’s own and for others’ actions.
It is quite possible that the neural activity seen in preparatory
motor responses substantially overlaps with the neural activity
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during the prediction of one’s own and of others’ forthcom-
ing actions. Predictable stimuli lead to faster reaction times, for
which the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) has been implicated
in terms of predictive motor coding (Jakobs et al., 2009), an
area also crucial to the mentalizing network. Prediction and sim-
ulation of an observed action in real-time is most relevant to
everyday action observation and action understanding in social
interaction. Graf et al. (2007) showed subjects actions where
part of the movement sequence was occluded, demonstrating
better predictive performance when the timing of the occluder
duration fit with the predicted movement, therefore suggesting
that predictive mechanisms involved in the observation of oth-
ers’ actions uses real-time simulations. An intriguing study from
Miles et al. (2010) found that mental time-travel, i.e., imagining
the past and the future, correlated with the direction of sub-
jects’ movements, with subjects swaying forward when thinking
about the future and swaying backwards when thinking of the
past, suggesting an embodied representation of time and space.
Interestingly, Mitchell (2009) highlights overlapping brain areas
responsible for mental state inference and remembering the past,
imagining the future, and spatial navigation to argue that internal
self-projections are central to theory of mind processes.
The difference between the underlying neural processing
involved in imagining and observing actions has relevance to the
ideomotor theory of action. Recently, numerous confirmations
of ideomotor principles have been revealed with neuroimaging
techniques, particularly with studies demonstrating motor cortex
activation for imagined actions (e.g., Decety, 1996). The ideo-
motor principle has also been used to explain imitation in an
attempt to overcome the correspondence problem of imitation,
in that movement specifics are not directly observable by the
observer, and therefore, there is no direct way to match sensory
input of another’s actions onto our own sensorimotor system
(Iacoboni, 2009; Massen and Prinz, 2009). Imagined actions and
events have also been found to influence self-monitoring (De
Lange et al., 2007; Turner et al., 2008), inferring a possible role
in self-referential processing and consequently also in dissociat-
ing between self and other. An intriguing fMRI study has revealed
that the prediction of sequential patterns can evoke activity in
areas of the premotor cortex that are related to motor proper-
ties of the context of the prediction (Schubotz and von Cramon,
2002), without the execution of an action. This suggests that
there may be a somatotopic mapping during the prediction of
upcoming sequential events on corresponding motor cortex. The
specificity of neural activity and dynamic changes involved in
action execution, observation, and imagination are yet to be fully
clarified. Paradigms investigating neural activity and behavior in
more ecologically-valid social interactive scenarios, such as those
using cooperative actions, are likely to shed more light on these
questions.
PREDICTING AND MOVING TOGETHER
Studies investigating coordinated and cooperative actions are
particularly relevant to social interaction and everyday social sce-
narios, in addition to passively observing actions. Joint action
can be defined as a social interaction whereby two people coor-
dinate their actions, often with a shared goal in mind (Sebanz
et al., 2006), in other words, a co-representation of the action
and its goal (Wenke et al., 2011). Given the implied role of the
mirror system in imitation, co-representation, and coordinated
actions, similar predictive mechanisms of prediction and simu-
lation recruited during action observation in the mirror system
could also be extended to apply to joint action, imitative, and
synchronous behavior.
Imitation and synchronization of action with another person
may reflect preparatory or anticipatory offline mechanisms dur-
ing action observation and online real-time prediction of action
(Konvalinka et al., 2010). Both may rely on similar processes of
motor simulation in the brain that directly relate to inferential
and predictive processes, in terms of prediction of forthcoming
action and forward models of action, whereby an internal rep-
resentation may guide imitation and synchronization facilitating
matching of the other’s actions. Individual differences in the abil-
ity to make temporal predictions for forthcoming events have
been found during interpersonal sensorimotor synchronization
(Pecenka and Keller, 2011), suggesting that temporal predictions
could be trained through observation (Scully and Newell, 1985),
and are also a necessary precursor to causal predictions, and
action-effect contingencies. Therefore, the ability to make tempo-
ral action predictions may also be directly related to the ability to
make more high-level, non-motor causal associations, inferences,
and interpretations in social scenarios, such as during the process
of mentalizing.
Automatic imitation andmimicry are thought to reflect under-
lying shared neural representations of action and mirror system
related activity (Brass and Heyes, 2005). Imitative performance
can be modulated by the social context of the action such as
whether the performer is a human or not, the degree to which
the observer relates to the performer of the action (Kühn et al.,
2011), the level of self-focus (Spengler et al., 2010), the strate-
gic context (Cook and Bird, 2011) and social attitudes (Cook
and Bird, 2011). Synchronized movement promotes coopera-
tive behavior (Wiltermuth and Heath, 2009) and the degree to
which we perceive others as similar to ourselves (Valdesolo and
Desteno, 2011) and the ability to pursue mutual goals together
(Valdesolo et al., 2010), thereby also likely encouraging social
cohesion. Joint action and interpersonal synchrony can also be
influenced by social context, including perceived group mem-
bership (Chartrand and Bargh, 1999; Miles et al., 2011). Muller
et al. (2011) found that ethnically white participants only showed
a joint compatibility effect when observing a white hand, but
not for a black hand, though this was eliminated when subjects
were asked to take the perspective of the performer. Differences
in group relations were also found to influence the tendency to
co-represent remembered items of the co-actor (He et al., 2011).
In addition to this, Humphreys and Bedford (2011) used neuro-
logical patients to infer that theory of mind and joint action may
have some common neural substrate.
It is clear that much work has already been done to investigate
the interdependency between high-level social cognitive process-
ing and low-level motor processes. The top-down influence of
social information on bottom-up neural motor activity and the
apparent embededness of social cognitive processing in the pro-
cessing of both one’s own and others’ motor actions demonstrates
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the potential coupling of movement to social cognition. It is also
evident that predictive mechanisms of simulation and inference,
and predictive coding frameworks, provide a fruitful foundation
on which to build further common dialogs between currently dis-
parate research disciplines and theoretical viewpoints. However, it
is not only the motor response associated with the observation of
others’ actions that is represented in the observer’s brain, but also
includes the consequence of the outcome and the implications of
the observed action in terms of error, feedback, and reward, and
therefore consequently influencing decision-making and learn-
ing. Predictive mechanisms also lie at the core of the processes of
evaluation of the outcomes of others’ actions, and can be applied
to both non-social and social contexts.
COGNITIVE CONTROL AND ERROR MONITORING IN A SOCIAL CONTEXT
The ability to accurately detect and process errors is crucial for
learning. Certain EEG ERPs are thought to be indices of error-
processing and the reward prediction error. The feedback-related
negativity (FRN) is evoked when negative or positive feedback is
given following response choice and is considered to be an index
of reward prediction and expectancy violation (Holroyd and
Coles, 2002). An error-related negativity (ERN) is seen follow-
ing the onset of muscle activation during an erroneous response
in a forced choice reaction time task (Falkenstein et al., 1990).
The ERN is an index of error-processing and response monitor-
ing, when the intended response is different from the executed
response (Baker and Holroyd, 2011), and has been found to orig-
inate from the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) (Dehaene et al.,
1994). Both the ERN and FRN are intrinsically linked to each
other and are mediated by the mesencephalic dopamine system
and projections to the ACC (Holroyd and Coles, 2002).
Some studies have recently shown that corresponding brain
activity involved in error and feedback processing can also be
evoked by the observation of others’ performance. An ERN and
FRN is evoked when watching other people’s mistakes (observa-
tional ERN or oERN) (Van Schie et al., 2004) and when observing
feedback from other people’s response choices (observational
FRN or oFRN), respectively, with the oERN and oFRN both also
thought to originate from the ACC (Yu and Zhou, 2006). Shane
et al. (2008) have confirmed the activation in the ACC, in the dor-
sal region, during one’s own and observation of a confederate’s
errors, with additional activity also being found in orbitofrontal
areas and premotor cortex. Though, interestingly, a dedicated net-
work appears to be active only when observing others’ errors,
which includes the inferior parietal cortex (IPC) and the rostral
and ventral parts of the ACC (r/vACC), with the IPC correlating
with measures of perspective-taking and the r/vACC correlating
with self-reported empathetic concern (Shane et al., 2008, 2009).
Another recent study found activity in the MPFC, an area associ-
ated with thementalizing network, specifically activated for errors
that affected others (Radke et al., 2011).
Observational error and feedback processing also seems to be
influenced by the degree of self-relatedness and the interpersonal
relationship between the observer and the performer, i.e., if the
performer is a friend or a stranger, with differences seen in activ-
ity in error-related brain areas (Newman-Norlund et al., 2009),
and in error-related (Carp et al., 2009) and feedback-related ERPs
(Kang et al., 2010; Ma et al., 2011). Competition and cooperation
appear to modulate processing of observed errors to the degree
that they influence performance monitoring and even modify
performance adjustments. For example, when observing some-
one else’s errors, it appears that a post-error slowing occurs for
one’s own errors in a cooperative scenario, although there is a
post-error speeding in the competitive scenario (De Bruijn et al.,
2012; Nunez Castellar et al., 2011). An ERN has also been found to
be evoked by observed errors performed by cooperators, whereas
observed correct responses of competitors evoked a later ERN
(Koban et al., 2010). It has been confirmed that this activity is
likely to be not just associated with self-reward, but is a reflection
of performance monitoring and updating of expected outcomes
based on others’ actions (De Bruijn et al., 2009). The FRN and
oFRN have also been shown to be modulated by competition
and cooperation (Itagaki and Katayama, 2008; Rigoni et al., 2010;
Van Meel and Van Heijningen, 2010), suggesting that this neural
response is influenced by both the benefit or loss to oneself, and
the benefit or loss of others (Marco-Pallares et al., 2010).
These studies all demonstrate how the neural processing of
both one’s own and others’ errors and feedback can be directly
influenced by social context and by differences in the social
relationships between confederates involved in a social scenario.
Therefore, the central role of error and feedback in predictive
mechanisms of inference and learning provides a fundamental
link between prediction and social cognition. However, an impor-
tant note to make here is that it is not clear as to how others’
gains interact with our own processing and valuation of reward,
i.e., from the observed choices of others. This is a crucial issue,
as it addresses the degree to which others’ gains can be reward-
ing for us. Differences in neural activity may be wholly reflecting
some form of “empathetic” response to others’ experience, or,
though not mutually exclusive, may be an index of the relevance
of the reward to oneself, as the outcome of others’ choices may be
indirectly associated with a reward for us.
SOCIAL LEARNING AND SOCIAL REWARDS
Observational learning is acquired through making associations
between actions and their outcomes, and the value associated
with that action and the predicted outcome. It is becoming more
apparent that there are some common cognitive and neural pro-
cesses driving both active experiential learning and observational
social learning. In particular, social learning has been proposed
to be based on the same simple processes recruited in associa-
tive learning. Heyes (2011) compares learning across different
species suggesting that learning only becomes social through
adaptation to interactions with conspecifics, and “tuning in” of
perceptual, attentional, andmotivational information channels to
other social agents. She convincingly argues that social learning
does not involve mechanisms that are different from those used
in non-social learning, and therefore do not have special “social”
properties. In support of this, Jones et al. (2011) found neural
activity in areas associated with basic reinforcement learning dur-
ing a task involving acceptance from peers. One fMRI study also
revealed similar underlying neural mechanisms during social val-
uation and non-social associative reward-based learning, finding
a “social prediction error” (Behrens et al., 2008). Computational
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modeling has also been used to relate the brain network respon-
sible for reward-related processing with the theory of mind net-
work (Behrens et al., 2009). Therefore, the principles underlying
associative learning can also be extrapolated to explore the role of
predictive mechanisms in observational social learning.
It is already known that the processing of reward is dependent
on the context in which the reward is presented (Nieuwenhuis
et al., 2005). Although, there is much evidence to suggest that
there is something special about social contexts (e.g., coopera-
tion versus competition) and social relations (e.g., ingroup versus
outgroup) that modulate the computation of value. Differences
in activity can be seen in brain areas associated with motivated
behavior and reward evaluation when a social betting task is
compared to non-social betting (Nawa et al., 2008), namely the
amygdala, the right DLPFC and the ventral striatum. The process-
ing of feedback and one’s own experience of reward, for others’
gains or losses interacts with how the observer views the other
person, in terms of the opinion or social evaluation of them. Our
own valuation of objects can be influenced by others’ opinions,
as Campbell-Meiklejohn et al. (2010) demonstrated differences
in activity in the ventral striatum, an area thought to code pre-
diction error-related activity, depending upon the opinion of an
“expert” reviewer. Ratings of subjective value and the associated
neural activity have also been shown to be affected by the valua-
tions made by one’s peers, particularly in the nucleus accumbens
and the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) (Zaki et al., 2011). In addition,
the dorsal striatum has been found to encode reward prediction
errors in both one’s own experiential instrumental conditioning
and the observation of others’ (Cooper et al., 2012). There is
some evidence to suggest that there may be a common under-
lying neural network related to one’s own valuation of rewards
and the valuation of others’ action outcomes during observational
learning, which may culminate in the ventromedial prefrontal
cortex (VMPFC) (Behrens et al., 2008; Hare et al., 2010). A
review of social preferences collates numerous fMRI studies to
find common activation in the dorsal and ventral striatum for
the processing of social rewards, with these areas substantially
overlapping with areas related to reinforcement learning and
anticipation of monetary reward (Fehr and Camerer, 2007), fur-
ther adding to the argument for shared neural representations for
one’s own and others’ rewards.
Sescousse et al. (2010) found prediction error-related activ-
ity in the ventral striatum, anterior insula, and the ACC for
monetary reward, and from the presentation of erotic stimuli,
suggesting some common coding of prediction errors regardless
of the type of reward, social or not. However, a more recent study
found distinctions between brain areas activated during the pro-
cessing of financial reward feedback, and the valuation of social
stimuli, suggesting some separability between the brain’s classi-
cal reward circuit and the network responsible for the valuation
of social stimuli (Evans et al., 2011). Furthermore, a distinction
between action prediction errors and outcome prediction errors
have been made in neural areas associated with observational
learning (Burke et al., 2010). The action prediction error is pro-
posed to reflect the discrepancy between expected and observed
action choices, coded in the DLPFC, and the outcome predic-
tion error is thought to represent the discrepancy between the
expected and observed outcome received by others, coded in the
VMPFC.
In social learning, it may be the case that social context and our
opinion of others induces different motivational states that cor-
respond to different utility functions, in terms of reinforcement
learning theory and expected utility theory, which consequently
dictate social decisions and future social judgments. The moti-
vational states in learning theory (Niv et al., 2006) are mappings
of the utility onto the outcome, whereby valuation is driven by
both external factors (i.e., the probability of the occurrence) and
the internal context (the motivational, emotional, and cognitive
state). This could be paralleled in social contexts in which the
internal state is driven by predetermined judgments and opinions
of the other person and our intrinsic social needs (the inter-
nal context), that is weighed up against a statistical probability
calculation based on prior experience, learned through socially
relevant stimuli and cues (the external factor).
There is conflicting evidence to argue for and against a distinc-
tion between social observational and non-social/active learning.
However, it appears that more weight is given to the side that
proposes a lack of distinction, in that both largely share some
common neural substrates, with both also utilizing a form of
prediction error, associated with both the valuation of one’s
own and of others’ outcomes in non-social and social scenar-
ios, respectively. Although it is clear that social learning involves
an additional dimension in which the social context can directly
influence the valuation of an outcome. The social context cre-
ated by the external environmental situation (e.g., competition
or cooperation) or by internal motivational states (including that
created from prejudice or through the social relationship with a
confederate) can determine the valuation of rewards from others’
outcomes. Consequently, social contextual factors will contribute
to the formation of social judgments and as a result could also
drive decision-making in social situations.
SOCIAL DECISION-MAKING AND ECONOMIC GAMES
Social decision-making deals with high-level computations based
on complex socially relevant information such as fairness, trust,
social norms, and social preference. Economic decision-making
in social contexts, though apparently recruiting additional pro-
cesses, is still rooted in reward processing and cognitive control,
and can also be framed in terms of probabilistic predictive com-
putations, and consequently has been shown to involve similar
neural structures in both social and non-social decision-making.
This has been largely explored with economic games that include
a social component, often with some form of social interaction.
Feedback indicating a violation of a social norm and social
expectation has been shown to evoke an FRN, suggesting that
the brain treats social deviance in a similar way to a prediction
error (Harris and Fiske, 2010; Kim et al., 2011). Klucharev et al.
(2009) also confirmed this with activity seen in the ACC and sup-
plementary motor area when there is conflict with a social norm.
It is likely that cooperative behavior and biding by social norms
is based on observational learning and inference-based processes
(Boyd and Richerson, 1988; Seymour et al., 2009; Yoshida et al.,
2010). These findings relate closely to studies showing the effect
of others’ opinions on our own valuation of objects, as previously
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mentioned. Popularity ratings have been shown to influence the
valuation of adolescents’ ratings of music, and interestingly, the
tendency to change one’s opinion of a song positively correlated
with activity in the anterior insula and the ACC (Berns et al.,
2010). Activity in the DLPFC and ACC, both crucially involved
in cognitive control and error processing, have consistently been
found to be activated when making moral decisions, in particu-
lar, when making decisions between fair and unfair offers (Sanfey
et al., 2003; Greene et al., 2004). A study using a social compar-
ison scenario that induced self-reported envy found that activity
in the dorsal ACC was positively correlated with levels of envy
(Takahashi et al., 2009). The ACC and DLPFC have also been
shown to be activated when one breaks a promise, as compared
to fulfilling that promise (Baumgartner et al., 2009).
The overlap between reward prediction error-related neural
activity and activity utilized in social judgments implies an under-
lying role of prediction in more complex, higher-level socially
relevant psychological processes, such as empathy, trust, judg-
ments of fairness, envy, shame, and guilt. Activity in the ventral
striatum has been found during the experience of mutual human
cooperation, as opposed to cooperating with a computer (Rilling
et al., 2002, 2004), with two other reward-related areas implicated
in reciprocated cooperation, namely the caudate nucleus (Rilling
et al., 2002, 2004; Delgado et al., 2005) and the OFC (Rilling et al.,
2002, 2004). It is likely that people experience some hedonic plea-
sure when acting altruistically (Thibaut and Kelley, 1959), which
outweighs the potential financial cost. This is confirmed in stud-
ies showing activity in the reward circuit when giving charitable
donations (Moll et al., 2005; Harbaugh et al., 2007). A proposed
computational model of decision-making demonstrates that the
application of reinforcement learning theory in game-theoretic
social interactions and imitative or inference based observational
learning can be used to generate altruistic behavior (Seymour
et al., 2009). The evaluation of fairness and the social compar-
ison of monetary rewards have been associated with activity in
the ventral striatum (Fliessbach et al., 2007), with fairer offers
also inducing greater activation in the VMPFC and higher subjec-
tive ratings of happiness (Tabibnia et al., 2008). The VMPFC has
also been found to be implicated in judgments of trust (Krajbich
et al., 2009) and being trusted by others (Li et al., 2009). The
DMPFC, caudate nucleus, and the striatum have been shown to
be activated when learning the trustworthiness of another per-
son (King-Casas et al., 2005). Findings of activity in the VMPFC,
medial OFC, and DLPFC in emotional synchrony of another per-
son also relate to this (Kühn et al., 2011). Implicit judgments of
trustworthiness from facial cues influence social decision-making
(Van ‘T Wout and Sanfey, 2008; Schlicht et al., 2010), and the use
of reinforcement learning models of trustworthiness also suggests
that the evaluation of trust is based on probabilistic beliefs that
are dynamically updated according to the proceeding experience
and prediction error (Chang et al., 2010).
The substantial overlap between areas encoding prediction
errors, error monitoring, and those implicated in social decision-
making tasks implies a common neural basis for social and non-
social decision-making processes. This therefore, also highlights
the central role of predictive mechanisms of inference in social
decision-making and the formation of complex social judgments.
In addition to shared neural representations of others’ motor
actions, outcomes of others’ actions, and the implications of oth-
ers’ actions on the observer, there can also be shared sensory and
emotional experiences when watching others. This then brings
us closer to a conceptualization of empathy in which we not
only experience the cold cognitive processes of others, but also
experience others’ emotional state during observation.
PREDICTING OTHERS’ FEELINGS
An interesting study has recently shown synchronized arousal,
reflected in heart rate data, among spectators and fire-walkers
during observation of a collective ritual (Konvalinka et al., 2011).
Just as sensorimotor matching or motor resonance can occur
during action observation, it appears that other people’s sen-
sations and emotions can also be contagious and therefore,
has consequently been linked with the mirror system. A recent
fMRI meta-analysis of areas implicated in the human mirror
system found significant overlap with areas involved in emo-
tional processing (Molenberghs et al., 2012). Observed tactile
stimulation can induce shared experiential and neural represen-
tations of the others’ somatosensation, including another’s pain.
Threat detection is involved in evaluations of trustworthiness
and social decision-making. This clearly has adaptive advantages
for survival and has evolved from the ability to efficiently per-
ceive fear-related stimuli, and can also be transmitted through
social interaction. Fear-conditioning is likely to be based on sim-
ilar predictive mechanisms as in reinforcement and associative
learning, and these principles could legitimately be extended to
explain the social transmission of fear by observational learn-
ing processes. Emotional contagion forms the basis for affective
empathetic responses (Decety and Ickes, 2009), which may be
founded on internal predictive or anticipatory emotional repre-
sentations (Gilbert and Wilson, 2007). Simulations of emotions,
or “pre-feelings,” may not only be used to imagine future emo-
tional states, but may also be used to simulate others’ emotional
states in social interactive scenarios.
Observing actions, tactile, and painful stimulation in oth-
ers all invoke activity in the brain of the observer in sec-
ondary somatosensory cortex (SII) and BA2 (Brodmann Area
2—posterior primary somatosensory cortex), which is adjacent
to SII (Keysers et al., 2010). Some authors have pointed out
a lack of distinction between motor and somatosensory activa-
tion during the observation of others’ actions, and consequently
argue for a lack of distinction between somatosensation and
motor processes in the hypothesized mirror neuron system (De
Vignemont and Haggard, 2008). Numerous fMRI studies have
confirmed this overlap showing activation of SII, but more signif-
icant activation of BA2 during action observation (Grezes et al.,
2003; Dinstein et al., 2007; Gazzola et al., 2007; Gazzola and
Keysers, 2009; Turella et al., 2009). Empathy and self-versus-
other-related processing can also influence somatosensory per-
ception (Jackson et al., 2006; Lawrence et al., 2006). Serino
et al. (2009) found that tactile somatosensation on one’s own
face, while observing another person’s face being touched, was
enhanced when the observed face was of the same ethnic or polit-
ical group. Serino et al. (2008) also previously discovered that
viewing one’s own face can enhance tactile sensitivity, which is
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also reflected by enhanced neural activity in a ventral parietal area
in a later fMRI study (Cardini et al., 2011). This also appears
to work in the other causal direction, in which somatosensory
stimulation of one’s own face can improve self-face recognition
(Tsakiris, 2008).
The prediction error signal has a crucial role in fear-
conditioning and avoidance behavior, achieved by learning rela-
tionships between harmful events and environmental stimuli
(Delgado et al., 2008; McNally et al., 2011; Spoormaker et al.,
2011). Many different animals can evidently learn fear from the
observed fear-related behaviors of a conspecific (e.g., John et al.,
1968; Kavaliers et al., 2001; Munksgaard et al., 2001; Knapska
et al., 2010). Aversive learning can be communicated by primates
through fearful face expressions, with some studies providing
support for the suggestion of common processes in fear con-
ditioning and observational fear learning (Mineka et al., 1984;
Mineka and Cook, 1993). Facial expressions are also one of
the main ways for socially transmitting fear in humans, with
the expression of another’s response to stimuli serving as the
Pavlovian aversive US (unconditioned stimulus) for the observer
(Gerull and Rapee, 2002). Other physical cues can also lead to
learned fear responses through observation (Berber, 1962), and
even just abstracted information about a fearful response can lead
to social transmission of fear (Hygge and Ohman, 1978), though
this is also determined by context (Lanzetta and Englis, 1989;
Singer et al., 2006). Neuroimaging studies reveal similar networks
involved in both fear conditioning and observational fear learn-
ing. Primarily, the amygdala is central to the processing of fear,
from both one’s own experience and from others’, though addi-
tional areas have been implicated exclusively in observational fear
learning, including the anterior insula and ACC, possibly reflect-
ing anticipation, and parts of the MPFC likely to be involved in
some mental state inferential processing of the observed person
(Olsson et al., 2007).
Fear and pain are directly related to one another, and in a
social context, observing someone else’s pain can induce a rep-
resentation of that pain in the observer, with activations seen
in the observer’s somatosensory cortex (Cheng et al., 2008).
Observation of others’ pain is also directly related to the social
transmission of fear. Neural responses induced by empathy for
others’ pain have also been shown to be modulated by perceived
fairness (Singer et al., 2006), group membership (Forgiarini et al.,
2011), emotional closeness (Beeney et al., 2011), emotional con-
text (Han et al., 2009), self-relatedness (Perry et al., 2010), the
identity of the person being observed and personality differ-
ences of the observer (Mazzola et al., 2010; Goubert et al., 2011).
Goubert et al. (2011) have presented an intriguing account of the
observation of pain and pain-related fear from an observational
learning perspective, with added recent experimental evidence
(Helsen et al., 2011). In support of this, Meulders et al. (2011)
have demonstrated that pain-relevant fear conditioning is driven
by associative learning mechanisms. It may also be the case that
learned aversive behavior is directly linked to reward processing,
in that it has been shown to be modulated by monetary reward
(Guo et al., 2011), and the avoidance of aversive outcomes may
in itself be rewarding, and therefore reinforcing aversion avoiding
behavior (Kim et al., 2006).
In sum, it is evident that anticipatory neural responses, and
predictive coding in the context of learning, are crucial to empa-
thetic somatosensory representations of others’ experiences and
consequently have a central role in observational learning of
fear and pain and emotional contagion. The learning of aver-
sive behavior, transmitted socially by others, will have substantial
mediating effects on social decision-making and social behav-
ior. Both fundamental predictive inferential mechanisms and
high-level expectations are likely to be at the root of such pro-
cesses, with interaction and interdependence between processing
levels forming the basis for fear-related social decision-making.
Predictive mechanisms of simulation and inference are likely to
form the underlying processes that allow us to have empathy for
others’ pain and to learn about aversive stimuli through observa-
tion. The ultimate function of shared representations of others’
actions, errors, rewards, sensations, and emotions is likely to be
the basis for understanding others’ minds in social interaction.
Arguably, at the highest level of understanding others’ minds is
the ability to make inferences about others’ mental states, which
may be founded upon many of the principles already discussed.
PREDICTING OTHERS’ MINDS
In social neuroscience, “mentalizing” or “theory of mind” refers
to the ability to infer the mental states of others, ultimately to
predict another person’s behaviors, and is a central topic of dis-
cussion. Daunizeau et al. (2010) present a meta-Bayesian model
for solving the Inverse Bayesian Decision Theory problem, which
is the problem of inferring the hidden causes of sensory signals
under a prior assumption about the causes. These signals are hid-
den both in our own experience of sensory input and also hidden
from the observer when observing others’ behavior, as we do not
have perceptual access to these sensory signals. When observing
others, the problem is that we are required to determine some-
one else’s prior beliefs and goals with only their behavior as the
information available to infer this. This meta-Bayesian solution
has been suggested to explain processes such as metacognition,
mental state inference, and theory of mind. A recent predictive
model of theory of mind has been proposed by Baker et al. (2011),
which relies on Bayesian inferential statistics to model belief and
goal-dependent action, which is mediated by the state of the envi-
ronment and perceptual access to the belief state, and by general
knowledge of the world and by general preferences. Bayes’ rule is
used tomodel mental state inference, in which action understand-
ing is acquired from integrating “bottom-up information from
observed actions and top-down constraints from the prior to
infer the goal, given observed actions and the environment.” This
inverse planning model is described to account for goal-based
predictions of future actions in new situations, according to pre-
dictions formed from similar previous experiences. Comparable
to this, the mental state inference model (MSI), another compu-
tational model of mental state inference, uses forward models of
action in a prediction circuit to incorporate visual feedback as the
control mechanism for inferring the goals and intentions of oth-
ers through mental simulation or motor imagery (Oztop et al.,
2005). Mental state inference and theory of mind may represent,
and be achieved by, the culmination of many fundamental predic-
tive inferential, and simulation processes related to the processing
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of others’ actions, errors, rewards, and emotional cues. It is also
evident that the models of mental state inference that incorporate
some predictive principles, such as Bayesian inferential statistics
and forward models of action, can accurately simulate behavior.
DISCUSSION
SUMMARY
In the present article, we sought to review findings from a huge
body of literature on the role of prediction in perception, action,
and learning. Specifically, our aim was to highlight the relevance
of prediction in the realm of social neuroscience. Accordingly,
prediction, in its many forms, plays a central and fundamental
role in social cognition. In light of the interaction and interde-
pendence of predictive processes at different levels of processing
and inference, such processes are best represented by hierarchical
models of the brain, as this also reflects the hierarchical struc-
ture of the cortex, with top-down predictions being conveyed
through backward connections, and prediction errors being prop-
agated forward across the cortical hierarchy. Previous experience
shapes and guides our current behavior and the choices we make.
Predictive coding models that include generative forward models
and Bayesian statistical inference present a plausible mechanis-
tic platform to integrate a broad range of topics. Adaptive social
behaviors and social learning relies on updating states based
on prediction errors. Experience-dependent development of sen-
sorimotor coupling may be crucial to the development of the
sensorimotor representation of the embodied self and a sense
of agency. Among these, this article draws numerous parallels
between fundamental principles of cognition, previously thought
to be non-social, with cognitive processes required for social
interaction.
Three main points are proposed in our review that link pre-
dictive mechanisms in the brain to processes encompassed in
social cognition. The first point is that both bottom-up sen-
sory input and top-down expectancies for non-social cognitive
processes, founded upon predictive principles of inference and
simulation, are responsible for social cognitive processes, and are
essential for the processing of social information. It is suggested
that the development of such non-social predictive mechanisms
are crucial in the development of socially relevant neural and
psychological processes. Secondly, but not unrelated to the first
point, this review highlights a number of studies which imply that
there may not be a categorical difference between related social
and non-social cognitive processes, particularly also in terms of
the neural substrates of such processes. The similarities between
neural activity recruited for our own experiences and during the
observation of others’ appear to outweigh the differences. Thirdly,
it is clear that the framing of stimuli in a social context can have
a modulatory influence on non-social predictive neural activity
and behavioral processes. Social contextual information evidently
has a substantial additive contribution to top-down modulations
of bottom-up sensory input. Generative forward models of per-
ception and action may integrate social information to facilitate
mental state inference and understanding of others’ actions and
intentions. It is also legitimate to propose the existence of “social”
forward models that compete against each other, with other non-
social forward models and with bottom-up sensory input. It is
also evident that there is a bidirectional relationship between
social information and sensory processing, i.e., both a forward
and inverse relationship.
COMPETING “SOCIAL” INTERNAL MODELS
Multiple bottom-up and top-down predictive systems are likely to
be at play in the brain, working together, and competing against
one another in different levels of processing, being both hierar-
chical and parallel in nature. Evidence for this can be seen in
the induction of interference in action-perception coupling (e.g.,
Zwickel et al., 2010a,b), whereby predictive systems compete with
each other. Anscombe (1957) states that there an almost infi-
nite number of possible inferential descriptions of a single action.
Comparatively, there are also an infinite number of inferential
interpretations of social cues, socially relevant stimuli, and social
scenarios. There may be internal “social” models that compete
with other top-down internal models, and bottom-up sensory
information, consequently causing the modulatory effect of social
information and social context on action, perception, learning,
and other cognitive processes. These generative “social” internal
models would be acquired through previous social experience
and social knowledge. This suggestion of competing social predic-
tive systems working in synchrony is supported by the MOSAIC
model for sensorimotor control and social interaction (Wolpert
et al., 2003), which proposes distributed cooperation and com-
petition of internal models whereby forward and inverse models
compete for overall control. Competition between predictive sys-
tems is also likely at different levels of information processing,
whereby bottom-up prediction in terms of perception and action
compete with likelihood estimations and top-down prior beliefs
(i.e., knowledge established from social experience) in addition
to the top-down priors proposed in current Bayesian predic-
tive models of perception and action. Top-down modulations of
prediction in social contexts are likely to be multidimensional,
including both cognitive and affective dimensions. Evidence of
competing predictive systems from the modulation of sensori-
motor control and action planning by social information (Ferri
et al., 2011; Sartori et al., 2009a,b) and emotional context is clearly
illustrated with numerous studies mentioned in this review.
SOCIAL PREDICTION ERRORS
A category of social prediction errors are likely to be present
in social learning, social action and interaction, and social
expectancy violations, reflecting the discrepancy between expec-
tation and actual experience in social situations. These subse-
quently may be founded upon similar cognitive processes and
neural substrates as prediction errors coded in non-social con-
texts. The difference between a social and non-social prediction
error would be that the social prediction error is mediated by
additional modulating factors, including social knowledge and
expectations of others’ behavior. For example the coding of the
social reward prediction error, when observing the outcomes of
others’ choices, may produce a prediction error similar to that
produced when one observes the outcome of one’s own choice,
but rather the value becomes relative to the effect of the observed
outcome on the observer, i.e., how rewarding other’s rewards are
to the observer. As already mentioned, this can be modulated by
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cooperation and competition, and by the relationship between
the observer and the performer. A social action prediction error
could be generated when predicting, simulating, or inferring oth-
ers’ actions in a social interaction, as described by the MOSAIC
model of social interaction (Wolpert et al., 2003). Another cate-
gory of prediction error that may be specific to social interaction
could be a higher-level complex prediction error that is founded
upon previously learnt social information whereby expectancies
about others’ social behavior are formed. This could be produced
in circumstances such as when social norms are violated or when
promises are broken. Expectations, or predictions, for this specific
social behavior prediction error could come from cultural knowl-
edge, or may be created by contextual information. Contextual
information for social expectancies could come externally from
environmental cues, and particularly the context of the social
situation, or could be generated from internal cues such as an
individual’s affective state, or from a cognitive bias, such as an
attributional bias.
THE “PREDICTIVE” BRAIN AS A FOUNDATION FOR THE
“SOCIAL” BRAIN
Due to the coupling of action, perception, and learning, it may
not be valid to consider these domains as separable or indepen-
dent, and consequently predictive coding models dealing with
these domains may overlap to the degree unto which they also
operate under some common processes. This may also be the case
for socially relevant cognitions in that the fundamentals of per-
ception and action are embedded in processes considered to be
specially “social,” but instead could be structural and functional
extrapolations of these fundamental principles that link action,
perception, and learning, i.e., fundamental predictive mecha-
nisms. Therefore, it also follows that it is improbable that distinct
neural structures or networks can be found as responsible for
predictive mechanisms, which may also parallel the ubiquity and
omnipresence of the “social brain” and the neural correlates of
social cognition and social interaction. As evident from many of
the studies mentioned in this article, there is substantial overlap
between the “predictive” brain (see Bubic et al., 2010) and the
“social” brain (e.g., Abu-Akel and Shamay-Tsoory, 2011), includ-
ing areas such as the DLPFC, MPFC, DMPFC, ACC, TPJ, OFC,
medial temporal areas, precuneus, ventral striatum, amygdala,
lateral parietal areas and the motor, premotor and somatosensory
cortices.
The modulation of predictive sensory, motor and learning
processes, and associated neural activity by social information,
could be explained merely by an enhanced attentional orientation
toward stimuli that have saliency created by the social relevance.
Social information may not be of a categorically different type,
as compared to non-social information, but instead could just
have a higher level of priority in terms of information process-
ing in the brain, and therefore be more pronounced in terms
of saliency, and consequently capturing attention and utilizing
greater cognitive resources. This would be in line with work on
social cue orienting; findings of automatic attentional orientation
to social cues (Driver et al., 1999), gaze cues and joint atten-
tion (Friesen and Kingstone, 1998). Tipper et al. (2008) found
little difference between brain areas activated with social cues
and non-social cues, though this is also contrasted by other con-
flicting studies (Greene et al., 2009). Prioritizing the processing
of social information over non-social information, in terms of
attentional orientation and cognitive resources, may have had
some adaptive evolutionary benefits for survival and reproductive
success.
EVOLUTION OF THE “PREDICTIVE” AND THE “SOCIAL” BRAIN
The ability to accurately predict future events is always a major
challenge for all living creatures, particularly because a failure
to learn from errors may have fatal consequences. This sug-
gests that natural selection has strongly operated on predictive
mechanisms, however, in very different ways. Hibernators, for
example, can “predict” future food shortages, even if they have
never experienced such a situation before. In other words, their
predictive knowledge is innate. In the case of our own species,
future scenarios are muchmore diverse, and therefore, even more
unpredictable. Consequently, prediction mechanisms need to be
more flexible, are more dependent on feedback (to adjust goal-
setting), and are perhaps more independent on actual sensory
input. For example, humans readily learn that there may be a
food shortage in the future, independent of the current food sup-
ply. In addition, the complexity of social encounters in ancestral
and contemporary societies has shaped predictive mechanisms
to become more sophisticated in social matters. Successfully pre-
dicting the behavior of conspecifics has almost certainly paid-off
reproductively.
From an evolutionary point of view, it is conceivable that pre-
dicting and anticipating the sources of potential threat, but also
the availability of food resources, is largely independent of specific
“social” contexts. Arguably, however, in primates and humans,
the increasing complexity of social environments may have left
its mark on how predictive mechanisms operate in the brain.
Put another way, predictive mechanisms have been constantly
shaped by environmental contingencies that, in the case of pri-
mates, consequently became more social, and less non-social.
Living in complex social groups or troops certainly poses dif-
ferent demands on predictive mechanisms compared to living a
solitary life. For example, while social group living provides pro-
tection from predation, it also increases intersexual competition
for mates. Consistent with this assumption, Sallet et al. (2011)
have shown that social network size and social status inMacaques
was correlated with gray matter volume in the superior temporal
cortex and rostral prefrontal cortex and with increased connec-
tivity between frontal and temporal areas, suggesting that the size
of the social group an individual is able to cope with impacts on
both brain structure and function (Sallet et al., 2011). Arguably it
should also be advantageous to be able to correctly predict the
behavior of conspecifics. Therefore, individuals who have been
better in predicting others’ behavior may have been those whose
genes benefitted from a greater reproductive success. If correct,
this strongly suggests that selection pressures operating on pre-
dictive mechanisms have made them more malleable by social
matters. A hypothesis derived from these considerations would be
that the brain areas concerned with “social” prediction are simi-
larly moulded by the complexity of the social environment (i.e.,
network size).
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org May 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 147 | 13
Brown and Brüne Prediction and social neuroscience
WHEN THE “PREDICTIVE” BRAIN GOES WRONG
The relationship between predictive mechanisms in cognition
and the brain, and social cognition also has implications in
psychopathology. If the development of predictive mechanisms
have evolved with increasing complexity, with the adaptation of
social cognitions as a result of this, then it is also probable that
deficits of social cognition (such as theory of mind, empathy,
imitation, self-recognition) are manifested by underlying distur-
bances in the “predictive brain” in pathologies like psychopathy
(Hare, 1980), autism (Mundy et al., 1986), and schizophrenia
(Brüne, 2005). Brazil et al. (2011) found a reduced ERN in psy-
chopaths only when observing others’ actions, when compared
to non-psychopathic subjects. However, they also found a reduc-
tion in the ERP for correct responses, therefore reflecting a more
general deficit in the processing of others’ action outcomes in
psychopathy. These findings suggests that deficits in higher level
social cognitions, such as empathy, may also be related to pro-
cessing of others’ actions and action understanding, and would
therefore be reflected in associated neural activity. This is also
suggested by studies that have found abnormalities in mirror-
neuron related activity in people with autism (Oberman et al.,
2005) and schizophrenia (Singh et al., 2011) as indexed by EEG
and the mu rhythm suppression, although conflicting results
make this still unclear (Raymaekers et al., 2009). It has been sug-
gested that psychosis may be partly caused by disturbances and
dysfunctions of predictive mechanisms in different domains and
in different levels of predictive processing. A deficit in funda-
mental predictive mechanisms of cognition may be expressed in
certain psychotic symptoms, including passivity symptoms such
as disturbances in sense of agency, auditory hallucinations, and
delusions of control (Fletcher and Frith, 2009; Corlett et al.,
2010), which are intrinsic to both social cognition and predictive
mechanisms. Inherent of this may also be the abnormalities seen
in error-processing in schizophrenia and the concurrent effects
on learning, cognitive control, and self-monitoring (Carter et al.,
2001).
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Future studies may aim to directly compare social and non-social
predictive processes in the brain and in behavior to further elu-
cidate how prediction is linked with social cognitive processes.
This article encourages a number of questions, with testable
hypotheses, which could be addressed by future work. Firstly
it is suggested that neural structures and networks involved
in non-social predictive processing, such as those coding for
the prediction error and the efference copy, are also essentially
utilized in social decision-making, social learning, and social
interaction. Meta-analyses of functional imaging studies com-
paring analogous social and non-social cognitive processes will
give more insight into this. It is also proposed that further work
be done to investigate the interaction between top-down social
information and expectations, non-social top-down priors and
bottom-up sensory input, and the competition between these.
Behavioral experiments comparing interference between levels of
social and non-social processing, and computational hierarchi-
cal models would be useful to investigate such questions. This
may also reveal different degrees of prioritization of information
processing according to social versus non-social categorization
of information. Pathological conditions associated with impair-
ments in social functioning may serve as appropriate models to
explore the independence of social cognition from predictive pro-
cessing. Fletcher and Frith (2009) present a Bayesian framework
for explaining the positive symptoms of schizophrenia and the
potential for dysfunctions of underlying predictive mechanisms,
such as the prediction error, corollary discharge, and efference
copy, being at the core of such symptoms. If distinct patterns of
impairment in predictive cognitive processes exist in such psy-
chopathologies, it can be hoped that these can be therapeutically
targeted to concurrently improve social functioning, and also to
reduce other pathological symptoms related to predictive pro-
cessing. Social interaction requires the understanding of others’
beliefs, intentions, and emotions, which are formed from our own
internal representations, and predictions, of others’ mental states,
though it is still under debate as to where and how internal rep-
resentations of other social agents are represented in the brain.
The use of a predictive coding framework provides conceptual
scaffolding to bridge different domains of cognition and differ-
ent research disciplines. In exploring social neuroscience under
the guise of prediction, a more integrated and inclusive approach
is permitted to understand the brain as a whole and not just a sum
of its parts.
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